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The aim was to examine how item repetition at encoding and response deadline at retrieval 
affect familiarity and recollection in 5-, 7-, or 11-year-old children (N = 156). Familiarity and 
recollection were estimated using a process dissociation paradigm. Direct comparison of the 
effects of repetition under unlimited and limited response time revealed a dissociation of 
familiarity and recollection. Recollection was both boosted (via repetition) and reduced (via a 
response time limit). Familiarity was unaffected by a response time limit. Moreover, 
repetition boosted familiarity only under unlimited response time. Together with several 
distinct age-related increases for recollection and familiarity, these results provide a challenge 
to single-process accounts of recognition memory. 
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When we encounter something, we believe we have experienced before, our 
recognition decision may be informed by different kinds of experiential evidence. We may 
find the item familiar without knowing anything more (familiarity), or we may remember 
specific details about the prior encounter with that item (recollection) (Mandler, 1980). While 
there is general acceptance that our experiences of remembering may vary, there is dispute as 
to whether this indicates the existence of two separate processes operating in recognition 
memory (dual-process theory: Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 2002), or a single process that varies 
in strength (single-process theory: Donaldson, 1996). Most of the debate in this area has 
focused on performance of adults across different experimental manipulations, with relatively 
little work looking at developmental trends. Here we seek to add to the developmental 
literature by looking at the impact of two experimental manipulations, item repetition at study 
and response time limit at test, in samples aged between 5 and 11 years.  
Dual-process theory posits that recollection and familiarity are independent processes 
(Diana, Reder, Arndt, & Park, 2006; Yonelinas, 2002) that vary in their time course.  
Recollection is slow and effortful whereas familiarity is a fast and automatic process (Jacoby, 
Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993; Tulving, 1985; Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012). In 
support of dual-process theory, developmental studies show that recollection and familiarity 
develop at different rates (Anooshian 1999; Brainerd, Holliday, & Reyna, 2004; Ghetti & 
Angelini, 2008; Koenig Wimmer, & Hollins, 2015) and are dissociable through experimental 
manipulation (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008; Koenig et al. 2015). For instance, Ghetti and 
Angelini (2008) found that a manipulation of study duration did not impact recollection in 6 – 
18-year-olds, but did alter familiarity, such that longer study durations eliminated 
developmental differences in familiarity entirely. The reverse pattern occurs with a 
manipulation at test: recollection can be manipulated with familiarity unaffected (Koenig et 
al., 2015). Limiting response time at retrieval reduced recollection in 5-, 7-, and 11-year-olds 




but did not impact familiarity. Further, recollection reliably differed between 5- and 7-year 
olds, but showed no further developmental increase, in line with the previously reported rapid 
developmental increase (Brainerd et al., 2004; Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). In contrast, 
familiarity continued to increase between 7 years of age and adulthood (Koenig et al., 2015). 
The combination of different experimental dissociations of familiarity and recollection and 
different developmental trajectories have been used to support the claim that they may be 
independent processes that contribute to recognition memory (Koenig et al., 2015; Ghetti & 
Angelini, 2008).  
In contrast, single-process theories characterise memory as a unified construct (Berry, 
Shanks, & Henson, 2008; Berry, et al., 2012; Donaldson, Mackenzie, & Underhill, 1996 
Dunn, 2008) in which previously encountered items differ in memory strength from an 
equivalent pool of unstudied items. Memory decisions about the status of an item are made 
by comparing its strength against one or more response criteria (Donaldson, Mackenzie, & 
Underhill, 1996; Dunn, 2008; Wixted, 2007). In this framework, decisions about familiarity 
and recollection represent the use of two response criteria at test, where a liberal criterion 
distinguishes old from new items and a conservative criterion distinguishes familiarity from 
recollection (Wixted & Stretch, 2004). Developmental trends may represent differences in the 
strength of memory and the setting of these response criteria. Specifically, Hayes, Dunn, 
Joubert, and Taylor (2017) ran a study in which children aged 6- and 10-years old encoded 
pictures under deep (e.g., is it light or heavy?) and shallow conditions (e.g., what colour is 
it?) and rated their confidence in each recognition decision at test (see Ghetti & Angelini, 
2008). ROC curves for the different age groups, generated as a function of encoding 
condition, revealed that single-strength models gave a better fit to the data than Yonelinas’s 
(2002) dual-process account. The authors therefore concluded that developmental differences 
in recollection and familiarity may be explained most parsimoniously by a single underlying 




strength process. However, while this conclusion may be appropriate for the manipulation 
they used, and the ages they tested, it may be premature to conclude that a single-process 
model could account for all potential developmental patterns across different experimental 
manipulations.  
The rationale for the present work was to provide a further, rigorous test of the single-
process account of developmental trends in recognition. However, before we present the 
proposed work, we need to explain our approach, and why we favour this over attempting to 
model our data with ROC analysis. Here we use a process-dissociation approach to estimate 
recollection and familiarity, based upon simple instructions about which responses to include, 
or exclude at test (Jacoby, 1991). We favour this over a ROC-based approach because it does 
not require metacognitive monitoring judgements in the form of confidence ratings. There is 
good evidence that children’s metacognitive ability to make accurate judgements of 
confidence increases between 5 and 10 years (Roebers, Gelhaar, & Schneider, 2004), yet they 
are equally able to understand inclusion and exclusion instructions (Koenig et al, 2015).  
In the present study, we manipulate item repetition during encoding and response time limits 
at test, within a single experiment, including 5- to 11-year-olds.  Prior research shows that 
item repetition during encoding increases both recollection and familiarity whereas a 
response deadline at test decreases recollection while leaving familiarity unaffected 
(Benjamin & Craik, 2001; Jacoby, 1999; Jacoby, et al., 1998). Both effects would be 
predicted in our current sample, but the crucial question of interest here is how these effects 
play out across the different age groups. Recollection increases steeply between 5 and 11 
years (Brainerd et al., 2004; Ghetti & Angelini, 2008; Koenig et al., 2015) and age 
improvements may underlie item-specific elaborative encoding processes once children have 
contextual binding ability (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008; Riggins, 2014; Sluzenski, Newcombe, & 
Kovacs, 2006). Under deep encoding conditions (focusing on the semantic meaning) 




recollection increases significantly between 6- and 10 years but not under shallow ones 
(focusing on surface features) (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). Therefore, we would expect 
increases in recollection between 5 and 11 years only under unlimited response time, 
allowing retrieval of item-specific details, but not under limited response time. Familiarity 
increases more gradually with increasing age (Brainerd et al., 2004; Ghetti & Angelini, 2008; 
Koenig et al., 2015) and increased encoding time eliminates developmental differences in 
familiarity, boosting 6-year-olds’ familiarity but not recollection (Ghetti & Angelini, 2008). 
If processing time at task proportionally facilitates familiarity in younger children, then we 
would expect our 5-year-olds to have comparable familiarity under unlimited response time 
but not under limited response time.  
We relied on the process dissociation paradigm (Jacoby, 1991) previously used to 
measure familiarity and recollection in 5-, 7-, and 11-year-olds (Koenig et al., 2015). 
Participants studied pictures (once or thrice) presented at the top or bottom of the screen and 
then received a recognition test either under self-paced conditions or with an age-appropriate 
response deadline. During recognition participants were instructed in the inclusion condition 
to accept all previously presented items and reject new words. In the exclusion condition they 
were instructed to accept only items which were presented at the top of the screen and to 
reject both items from the bottom of the screen and new items. Familiarity and recollection 
parameters were estimated by contrasting performance in the inclusion and exclusion 
conditions (see Jacoby, 1991).  
Experiment 
Participants encoded pictures either once or thrice presented at the top or bottom of 
the screen. At test participants either responded self-paced or under a response deadline. The 
amount of time available to respond was manipulated in the same way as reported in Koenig 




et al. (2015). For each age group, an age-appropriate time limit was calculated, based on the 
findings from unlimited response condition.  
Method 
Participants. Overall 156 children (71 girls) participated. There were 48 5-year-olds 
(M = 5.1 years, SD = 4 months), 53 7-year-olds (M = 7.4 years, SD = 3 months), and 55 11-
year-olds (M = 11.0 years, SD = 5 months). Four additional children were excluded because 
they were unable to repeat the instructions of the recognition task. Power calculations 
(Gpower3; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) revealed that 135 participants will be 
needed to detect a within-between factor interaction, giving a 95% chance of detecting 
medium sized effects on the mixed ANOVA (f = .25) with p = .05. Children were recruited 
from local schools with a predominantly Caucasian middle-class intake, following parental 
consent and their own assent on the day of testing. 
Design, Materials and Procedure. The study employed a 2(item repetition at study: 
once vs. thrice) x 2(response time at test: unlimited vs. limited) x 3(age groups: 5-, vs. 7-, vs. 
11-year-olds) mixed design where item repetition was manipulated within participant and 
both response time and age groups were the between participants variables. Materials and 
procedure followed closely Koenig et al. (2015). The task was computerized and presented 
using E-Prime. In total, 94 items from Rossion and Pourtois (2004) were used, originally 
based on Snodgrass and Vanderwart's (1980) line drawings.  
The study phase started with four practice trials where participants judged whether the 
item is typically found indoors or outdoors. If participants failed the first four practice trials, 
another set of four practice trials was presented. None of the participants needed more than 
two repetitions to pass all practice trials.  
Upon completing the practice task, participants completed the study-retrieval block. 
Participants were instructed to remember as many items as possible (Figure 1). The study 




phase was divided into 4 sets each containing 14 pictures, each presented for 3000 ms. After 
14 pictures a star appeared to sustain motivation and the next set started. Half of the items 
were presented at the top, and the other half were presented at the bottom of the screen. 
Participants were not explicitly instructed to focus on location. After each item, a blank 
screen appeared until participants judged whether the object is more typically found indoors 
(half of items per block) or outdoors (the other half per block). Half of the items were 
presented once, and the other half were presented thrice (location of individual items did not 
change between trials). There were between 10 and 18 items intervening between repetitions 
of any item, thus, study presentation order was fixed.  
The recognition phase followed immediately.  Just over half (N = 81) of the children 
completed the recognition task with an unlimited response time. The remainder (N = 75) were 
required to make a recognition decision before a response time deadline that was set at one 
standard deviation below mean response times per age group in the unlimited condition (cf., 
Koenig et al., 2015), resulting in deadlines of 3751 ms for 5-year-olds, 3248 ms for 7-year-
olds, and 2293 ms for 11-year-olds. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible. If participants did not respond within the deadline, an alarm tone 
sounded, the message “too slow” appeared in red letters on the screen and participants were 
reminded by the experimenter to respond within the allotted deadline.  
There were two recognition conditions, inclusion and exclusion, with order 
counterbalanced across participants. Each started with a practice phase (Figure 1) in which 
participants were reminded of the four study items from the practice phase and were then 
presented with four recognition items. Participants were required to answer all practice items 
appropriately to the test condition, described below, to reach criterion and proceed to the 
recognition test. No participant required more than two practice test repetitions. In the 
inclusion condition participants were instructed to respond “yes” to all items that had been 




previously presented and to reject new items. In the exclusion condition participants were 
instructed to respond “yes” only to words that had been previously presented in the top half 
of the screen and to reject items that were presented in the bottom half of the screen (below 
the line) and new items. Both recognition conditions contained 42 items consisting of 14 
items previously presented at the top of the screen, 14 from the bottom of the screen and 14 
new items that were not semantically related to any of the studied items.  
To obtain measure of familiarity and recollection for each participant it was necessary 
that participants completed both inclusion and exclusion recognition phases. Recollection 
was calculated by subtracting yes responses to non-targets in exclusion from yes-responses to 
targets in inclusion, R = yes inclusionnon-target – yes exclusionnon-target.  Familiarity was 
calculated from estimates of recollection, F = yes exclusionnon-target/(1 - R) (see Jacoby, 1991; 
Koenig et al., 2015 for further details). 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Results and Discussion  
The data are available at 10.6084/m9.figshare.11396304. Bonferroni post-hoc and 
confidence interval adjustments were used throughout. Mean proportions of “yes” responses 
as a function of age group, repetition (once vs. thrice presented) and item type for inclusion 








Insert table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert table 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Preliminary analyses  
In the limited response deadline condition, failure to respond within the deadline was 
low overall but higher in 5-year-olds (14.19 % of trials) than both 7-year-olds (5.51%, p 
= .003) and 11-year-olds (3.04%, p < .011) who did not differ (p > .05), F(2, 158) = 10.87, p 
< .001, ηp
2  = .12. Only responses within the response deadline were analysed.  
Acceptance rates to new items 
To establish whether assumptions underlying the PDP were met, it was first examined 
whether acceptance rates to new items differed between inclusion and exclusion across age 
groups (Curran & Hintzman, 1997; Graf & Komatsu, 1994). A 2(condition: inclusion vs. 
exclusion) x 2(response time: limited vs. unlimited) x 3(age group: 5-, vs. 7-, vs. 11-year-
olds) mixed ANOVA on the proportion of yes responses to new items was conducted with 
condition as within participant variable and the latter two variables were manipulated 
between participants.  
There was no evidence of a difference in yes responses to new items in inclusion (M 
= .08) and exclusion (M = .09), F (1, 150) = 1.44, p = .23, ηp
2 = .01 or between age groups F 
(2, 150) = 2.67, p = .07, ηp
2 = .03. There were more yes responses to new items during limited 
(M = .12)  than unlimited response time (M = .04), F (1, 150) = 32.79, p < .001, ηp
2 = .18 
(Tables 1 and 2). The age group x condition interaction was almost significant, F (2, 150) = 
3.03, p = .051, ηp
2 = .04 (Tables 1 and 2) but even when it was disentangled, there was no 




evidence in any age group of a reliable difference in yes responses to new items in inclusion 
and exclusion (ps > .08). There were no further interactions, Fs < 2.20, ps > .11.  
To further assess the evidence, we calculated the Bayes factor, using a JZS prior 
(Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) separately for limited and unlimited 
response times as there was an overall difference in yes responses to new items. For unlimited 
response time the odds, BF = 4.062 are in favour of the null hypothesis. For limited response 
time the odds, BF = 9.55 are also in favour of the null hypothesis. Thus, there was no reliable 
evidence to suggest that any age group changed their response criterion between inclusion 
and exclusion. Therefore, raw familiarity and recollection parameters are reported.1   
Recollection and Familiarity  
To investigate the effects of limiting response time and item repetition, recollection 
and familiarity estimates were entered into two 3 (age group: 5- vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds) x 2 
(time limit: unlimited vs. limited response time) x 2 (repetition: once vs. thrice) ANOVAs 
with age group and experiment as between-subjects variable and repetition as within-subject 
variable.  
Recollection. Repeated item presentation (M = .57) increased recollection compared 
to single item presentation (M = .43), F(1, 150) = 35.80, p < .001, ηp² = .19. Limiting 
response time reduced recollection (M = .45) compared to no limit (M = .55), F(1, 150) = 
7.76, p = .002, ηp² = .05. Additionally, recollection increased with increasing age, F(2, 150) = 
7.21, p = .001, ηp² = .09, where recollection based responses were lower in 5-year-olds (M 
= .40) than both in 7- (M = .54, p = .009) and 11-year-olds (M = .56, p = .002) and the latter 
two did not differ (p = 1.00). There was also an age x time limit interaction, F(2, 150) = 4.83, 
p = .009, ηp² = .06. This interaction occurred because under unlimited response time 
 
1When base rates to new items were taken into account by using the dual-process signal 
detection model to estimate R and F (Yonelinas, Regeher, & Jacoby, 1995) the same main 
results were obtained and so we do not discuss this further.  




recollection increased with age, between 5- and both 7- (p = .001) and 11-year-olds (p < .001) 
who did not differ whereas it did not increase at all under limited response time (ps = 1.0) 
(Figure 2). There were no further interactions (Fs < 1.33, ps > .26). 
Familiarity. Item repetition (M = .64) increased familiarity compared to no repetition 
(M = .55), F(1, 150) = 6.38, p = .013, ηp² = .04. Limiting response time (M = .58) did not 
affect familiarity compared to self-paced responses (M = .61), F(1, 150) = .56, p = .46, ηp² 
= .004. Additionally, familiarity increased with increasing age, F(2, 150) = 5.78, p = .004, ηp² 
= .07, which is due to an increase between 5 (M = .51) and 11 years (M = .68, p = .003). 
Seven-year-olds (M = .59) did not differ from the other two age groups (ps > .16) (Figure 3).  
Moreover, the results were qualified by two interactions. The age group x response 
time limit interaction, F(2, 150) = 5.47, p = .005, ηp² = .07, showed that there were no age 
group differences under self-paced conditions (all ps = 1.00) whereas familiarity increased 
under limited response time, particularly, between 5- and both 7- (p = .03) and 11-year-olds 
(p < .001) who did not differ (p = .13). Further, the repetition x response time limit 
interaction shows that under self-paced conditions repetition increased familiarity (p = .001) 
but under limited response time repetition had no effect on familiarity (p = .73), F(1, 150) = 
4.09, p = .04, ηp² = .03 (Figure 3). There were no further interactions (Fs < 1.92, ps > .15). 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------- 








In a single study we implemented two manipulations that differentially affected both 
recollection and familiarity. Recollection was increased by item repetition at study and 
decreased by a response deadline at test, and these two effects did not interact. In contrast, for 
familiarity the two manipulations had an interactive effect, such that familiarity was 
increased by repetition at study only with unlimited response time at test. Overall, response 
deadline had no overall impact on familiarity at all. Our findings that recollection can both be 
boosted and reduced, and familiarity can be boosted are in line with previous research with 
adults showing dissociating effects on both processes (Jacoby, 1999). For familiarity, in 
contrast to recollection, the boost for repetition disappeared under a response time limit. This 
additional finding poses explanation difficulties for the argument that recollection is a more 
sensitive measure (Henson, 2006) as the effect of repetition varied for familiarity under 
limited and unlimited response time as opposed to recollection.  
We also observed different developmental patterns for the two measures. 
Recollection increased across the age groups: this effect was not altered by the encoding 
manipulation, but was impacted by the response deadline at test, such that age improvements 
were removed by the imposition of a test deadline. Thus, a time limit at test interferes with 
retrieval of item specific details particularly in older children. Familiarity also increased with 
age and, as with recollection, this pattern was not altered by repetition. Also, like 
recollection, there was an interaction between age and the response deadline effect, but the 
nature of this interaction was very different. For familiarity a developmental trend emerged 
with limited response time between 5- and 11-year-olds but there was no age difference with 
unlimited response time. Thus, extra time at test boosted 5-year-olds’ familiarity suggesting 
familiarity may be slower in younger children. These developmental trends support previous 
results imposing response time limits (Koenig et al., 2015) and add to findings of increased 
familiarity in 6-year-olds under increased processing time at encoding (Ghetti & Angelini, 




2008). Together, manipulations of processing time affect developmental trends of familiarity 
and recollection differently whereas item repetition does not.  
The response time limit used in the current research is more liberal than the 1500ms 
(or below) employed in research with adults (e.g, Koen & Yonelinas, 2011; Ngo & Lloyd, 
2016). However, mean response times under unlimited response time were much higher in 
our developmental sample and a too strict time limit may have disproportionally affected the 
ability to respond within the deadline in the younger age group. As response times differed 
across age groups, we set the limit at one standard deviation below the mean response in the 
unlimited condition for each age group. The current finding that the response time limit 
impaired 7- and 11-year-olds’ recollection and eliminated developmental differences suggests 
that the limit sufficiently hampered recollection at least in the older age groups. For 5-year-
olds it is also unlikely that the response deadline was too liberal because failure to respond 
within the deadline was higher (14.19 % of trials) than in both 7-year-olds (5.51%) and 11-
year-olds (3.04%) who did not differ. Thus, it is unlikely that the response time limit was too 
liberal to hamper recollection across age groups.   
A potential criticism of the current methodology is the switch in modality from 
pictures during encoding and words at test that could affect performance particularly in the 
youngest age group. If so, we would have expected poorer recollection in 5-year-olds 
specifically under limited response time which was not the case. However, changes in study-
test modality have generally larger reducing effects on familiarity than recollection 
(Yonelinas, 2002). This may explain the finding that 5-year-olds’ familiarity was lower than 
both 7- and 11-year-olds under limited response time but could be boosted under unlimited 
response time, supporting the notion that familiarity may be slower in 5-year-olds.  
Overall, it is difficult to see how these findings can be accounted for with a single-
process assumption that familiarity and recollection underlie a single strength-based retrieval 




process (e.g., Donaldson et al., 1996; Wixted, 2007). According to a single process account 
(such as the equal variance signal detection theory model), repetition and a response time 
limit should have impacted familiarity and recollection parameters similarly, which was not 
observed.  
However, recently, Hayes et al. (2017) compared the goodness of fit of several 
models representing the single- and dual process accounts across age, concluding that one of 
the single process models captured the results best. The youngest age-group tested was 6-7 
years old, and the oldest age-group was 18 years old. As our present work demonstrates, 
much of the developmental change may already have taken place by the age of 7, with some 
stark differences emerging between 5 and 7 years and even earlier (Riggins & Rollins, 2015). 
In fact, if we had studied the 7-year-olds in isolation we would have concluded that the 
single-process model adequately explained the results. 
Instead of using the process dissociation paradigm, Hayes et al. (2017) relied on the 
modelling of confidence ratings. Although this approach is common in research with adults, 
the assumption that children at different age groups indicate their confidence as accurately as 
adults is an open question. There is clear evidence that distinguishing between correct and 
incorrect responses with confidence ratings increases between 5 and 10 years (Roebers et al., 
2004). One possibility is that any developmental differences in memory obtained from the 
modelling of confidence ratings are driven by the better development of meta-cognition. 
Similarly, any failures to find differences in the predicted direction in younger children may 
be driven by the confidence-rating procedure adding asymmetric noise into the response 
patterns. The process dissociation paradigm used here does not rely on the use of confidence 
ratings and is not susceptible to these issues. Our children’s response rates to new items were 
very low across all ages indicating that they had no problem to follow task instructions. Only 




four children were excluded because they could not repeat the exclusion and inclusion 
instructions at the end of the experiment.  
One potential counterargument is that the most appropriate single process account in 
this context, the unequal variance signal detection theory model (Wixted, 2007), has an 
additional signal-to-noise variance ratio parameter which could hypothetically vary as a 
function of repetition, time limit and age. If one takes this perspective, it may be the case that 
any differential effects of time limit on recollection and familiarity as a function of age are 
merely changes to this variance ratio. In response, we would argue simply that we are 
unaware of any such predictions in a developmental context, and that formal model 
comparisons will have to be used to rule out this alternative interpretation. These models 
cannot be applied to our current data as we have not collected confidence ratings and we first 
would need to establish that children at different ages are equally accurate at distinguishing 
between correct and incorrect responses with confidence ratings which should be considered 
in future research. Overall, the process dissociation procedure is not susceptible to these 
issues and has been shown to be a valid tool in providing valuable behavioural insight into 
the development of familiarity and recollection processes.  
Beyond the direct contribution to process theories, the current findings also add to a 
growing body of literature on the type of events children begin to recollect, that is, the 
number of items presented (Koenig et al., 2015), the list origin (Anooshian, 1990), and item 
location (current findings). In addition to recollecting single item properties, 4-year-olds also 
begin to recollect specific item-context associates (Lloyd, Doydum, & Newcombe, 2009) and 
different event aspects including a scene, person, and object (Ngo, Horner, & Newcombe, 
2019). Together, findings highlight important qualitative developments in recognition 
memory in addition to the current result of dissociated memory processes.     




In sum, the combined finding of different age trends for familiarity and recollection, 
the dissociation of boosted recollection when information is repeated but reduced under a 
response time limit and the repetition boost for familiarity only under unlimited response 
time pose explanation difficulties for the notion that familiarity and recollection underlie a 
single process.  
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Table 1. Mean proportions of “yes” responses of item type for inclusion and exclusion 
condition under unlimited response time. 
 5-year-olds 
(N = 27) 
7-year-olds 
(N = 26) 
11-year-olds 
(N = 28) 
 Once  Thrice Once Thrice Once Thrice 
Exclusion       
New items .04 (.08) .04 (.06) .03 (.04) 
Non-targets .35 (.26) .45 (.25) .26 (.20) .21 (.15) .26 (.22) .21 (.22) 
Targets .51 (.24) .60 (.25) .54 (.18) .68 (.27) .66 (.22) .86 (.18) 
Inclusion       
New items .08 (.08) .04 (.06) .03 (.07) 
Targets .68 (.18) .84 (.12) .77 (.15) .91 (.09) .87 (.10) .94 (.08) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Note that in inclusion for the participants there 
are no non-targets, they are all targets.  
 
  




Table 2. Mean proportions of “yes” responses for item type in inclusion and exclusion as a 
function of age and repetition under limited response time. 
 5-year-olds 
(N = 22) 
7-year-olds 
(N = 27) 
11-year-olds 
(N = 27) 
 Once Thrice Once Thrice Once Thrice 
Exclusion       
New items .13 (.20) .11 (.12) .11 (.13) 
Non-targets .26 (.24) .25 (.19) .38 (.27) .31 (.27) .48 (.23) .33 (.24) 
Targets .31 (.26) .41 (.26) .61 (.20) .70 (.22) .67 (.25) .78 (.17) 
Inclusion       
New items .15 (.12) .16 (.13) .07 (.07) 
Targets .66 (.15) .75 (.13) .77 (.11) .86 (.10) .81 (.14) .90 (.13) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Note that in inclusion for the participants there 
are no non-targets, they are all targets.  
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Figure 1. Experimental procedure. Some items were presented once (e.g., car, cake) and 
others presented thrice (e.g., crocodile, banana). 
Figure 2. Recollection parameter estimates as a function of item repetition, age group and 
experiment (unlimited versus limited RT). 
Figure 3. Familiarity parameter estimates as a function of item repetition, age group, and 
experiment (unlimited versus limited RT). 
 
 
